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Abstract
As accessibility to data increases, so does the need to increase security. For organizations
of all sizes, information security (IS) has become paramount due to the increased use of
the Internet. Corporate data are transmitted ubiquitously over wireless networks and have
increased exponentially with cloud computing and growing end-user demand. Both
technological and human strategies must be employed in the development of an
information security awareness (ISA) program. By creating a positive culture that
promotes desired security behavior through appropriate technology, security policies, and
an understanding of human motivations, ISA programs have been the norm for
organizational end-user risk mitigation for a number of years (Peltier, 2013; Tsohou,
Karyda, Kokolakis, & Kiountouzis, 2015; Vroom & Solms, 2004). By studying the
human factors that increase security risks, more effective security frameworks can be
implemented. This study focused on testing the effectiveness of ISA programs on enduser security behavior.
The study included the responses of 99/400 employees at a mid-size corporation.
The theory of planned behavior was used as model to measure the results of the tool.
Unfortunately, while data collected indicated that ISA does cause change in security
behavior, the data also showed no significance. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Abundant research suggests that individual users play a critical role in the security of
information systems and that no solution can be solely based in technology (Brdiczka et al.,
2012; Crossler et al., 2013; Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron, 2016; Hsu, Shih, Hung, & Lowry,
2015). Cybercriminals (aka hackers) typically employ well-known social engineering tricks
(the act of persuading users into careless security behaviors) such as malware, email
phishing, and other behavior-related tactics in order to circumvent technical security
solutions (Mann, 2012). Such “social engineering” continues to plague end-users, despite the
existence of a breadth of information and countermeasures that help promote prudent security
behavior (Furnell & Moore, 2014). It follows that informed awareness and an understanding
of the types of behaviors that compromise security are key ingredients for a successful riskmitigation program (Goodhue & Straub, 1991; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Viduto,
Maple, Huang, & López-Peréz, 2012).
Both technological and human strategies must be employed in the development of an
information security awareness (ISA) program. By creating a positive culture that promotes
desired security behavior through appropriate technology, security policies, and an
understanding of human motivations, ISA programs have been the norm for organizational
end-user risk mitigation for a number of years (Peltier, 2013; Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, &
Kiountouzis, 2015; Vroom & Solms, 2004). It is therefore interesting to analyze whether ISA
programs are effective in building desired end-user security behavior and whether they
deliver on the promise of more secure user actions within the organization.
As accessibility to data increases, so does the need to increase security. For
organizations of all sizes, information security (IS) has become paramount due to the
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increased use of the Internet. Corporate data are transmitted ubiquitously over wireless
networks and have increased exponentially with cloud computing and growing end-user
demand. This swing can be seen in the vast increase in the number of cybercrime-related
incidents in the past few years. According to Brahme and Joshi (2013), cybercrime increased
steadily every year from 1998 to 2013, with IS events peaking at over 3.5 million reported
incidents in 2013. IS seeks to protect data under the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA) model that has been in place since 1969 (Howe, 1978) and which is still used as a
framework for today’s security programs (Younis & Kifyat, 2013).
The three tenets of the CIA model embrace both technological and behavioral
components of security: Confidentiality allows information to be used or seen only by
intended targets; integrity dictates that data will be unchanged between author and consumer;
and availability ensures that systems are up and able to provide information when called
upon (Whitman & Mattord, 2011). The large majority of risk mitigation strategies are built
on the CIA framework, and current research focuses more on the human components of the
model (Alfawaz, Nelson, & Mohannak, 2010). This focus on human factors strays from the
more traditional technological approach toward security.
A technologically-driven philosophy of cyber security is grounded in the theory that
innovative technology builds stronger defenses against data loss and that human error can be
curbed with deterrence. However, it has been shown that an organization’s dependence upon
deterrence and technical solutions to alleviate security risk is a vast oversight, as other human
behavioral factors must be considered (Balcerek, Frankowski, Kwiecień, Smutnicki, &
Teodorczyk, 2012; Crossler et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2011), and research that focuses on secure
end-user habits is increasing (Alfawaz et al., 2010; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnil, 2014).
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Such an approach proactively compensates for the many unanticipated factors (born in
human carelessness) that compromise security and for which technology continues to fall
short.
For instance, the problem with a penalty deterrent model is that it assumes all security
attacks are done with malicious intent, ignoring the capricious idiosyncrasies of accidental
events (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Goalletta. 2011; Desman, 2013; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly.
2011). A better solution is to develop an ISA program creating a culture of security
awareness by combining technology, security policy, and an understanding of human
behavior. Increasing employee awareness of how to protect data in both technical and human
terms has been found to be the best risk-mitigation strategy within an organization, reducing
the need, cost, and frustration of planning for every conceivable contingency (Bulgurcu et al.,
2010; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Pahnila, Karjalainen, & Siponen, 2013). With these factors in
mind, ISA would seem to be a more sensible alternative to the traditional technologicallydriven approach to cybersecurity.
Abundant research supports the use of ISA as an effective method for risk-management
programs (Ciampia, 2103; Mylonas, Kastania, & Gritzalis, 2013; Peltier, 2013), but research
is lacking as to whether it truly promotes secure end-user habits. There is little to no research
that looks at data loss, accidental or malicious, and how it relates to the habitual tendencies of
end-users as moderated by ISA in mid-sized organizations. More specifically, it would be
beneficial to the future of cybersecurity to analyze ISA’s contribution to information security
risks and human factors in the corporate environment. By shedding light on the human
factors that increase security risks, more effective security frameworks can be implemented
hand in hand with the development of risk-mitigation strategies (Lin, 2010; Siponen et al.,
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2014; Whittman & Mattford, 2011). Such an analysis would seem to be critical toward
understanding the true potential of ISA in effectively deterring cyber-attacks in the corporate
setting.
Another factor that must be considered is that different-sized organizations require
different security solutions. Since organizations vary greatly in staff size, budget, and culture,
they present many of their own characteristic security challenges. This particular study will
review cyber security in a single midsize organization and thus create a tool to measure the
effects of ISA programs in other midsize organizations. A midsize company is defined by
Gartner (2014), the leading IT analytics and metric organization in the world, as one that has
100–999 employees (end-users) with annual revenue of more than $50 million but less than
$1 billion. An end-user is defined as the person for whom a hardware or software solution is
designed. The terms organization and company will be treated with equal meaning in this
document.
Organizational security behavior, or security hygiene, is the set of information data
protection expectations that a company places on the end-user as part of security practice. A
security event is a change from the operational norm of information systems or services that
violates typical security policy, safeguards, or technology (Whittman & Mattford, 2011). As
a consequence, technical and human security controls vary with the number of end-users and
the type of data to be secured (Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). However, end-users of digital
data do share similar security concerns, regardless of the size of an organization or the type
of data, since data loss in any organization could be catastrophic (Whittman & Mattford,
2011). Hence, tactics for diligent planning and the constant assessment of behavioral traits
that compromise company security would translate well to any company size or setting.
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This study will extend Ajzen’s (1985) theory of planned behavior (TPB) to study the
effect of ISA on end-user behaviors. Ajzen’s research found that by finding an individual’s
intention, one could, in turn, predict behavior. A survey will collect data on the three main
constructs (Fig 1) of TPB for a single midsize company that deploys an ISA program as a
part of its security strategy. The results of the research will be limited to the company in
question, as all ISA programs are deployed with some variation. The tool, however, could be
used as a predictor of all midsize companies.
TPB constructs include attitude toward behavior (ATT), subjective norm (SN), and
perceived behavioral control (PBC; Ajzen, 1985). ATT is a measure of how important the
behavior in question is to the individual and is formed from Davis’s (1989) technology
acceptance model, specifically ease of use and perceived usefulness. SN is a social
measurement that examines the social burden (driven by peer and supervisor influences) to
perform or not perform a certain behavior. PBC is built upon Bandura’s (1977) tested and
proven theory of perceived self-efficacy being a key foundation to behavior (Ajzen, 1980,
1985).

Figure 1. Construct of Ajzen’s TPB theory.
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When data loss occurs from within a company, experts categorize it as an internal
threat. Internal threats come in two major forms—intentional harm and misuse—but both
forms result in data loss and/or service outage (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnil, 2014).
Predictably, the nomenclature used to describe an organization’s actions to mitigate threats
describes defensive measures, while attacks, either intentional or unintentional, are described
and classified as offensive threats (Lin, 2010). Table 1 describes some current tactics that
companies use to deter internal threats, including end-user behavioral measures and ISA, the
focus of this research (Ahmad, Maynard, & Park, 2012; Whitman & Mattord, 2013). Table 1
illustrates broad organizational defense tactics that preceded end-user security measures.
Table 1
Definitions of ISA Strategies
Information Security Awareness
Organizational Information Security technology
deployed: hardware/software tools used to mitigate
security events
Organizational Information Security
awareness/culture: the security culture of the
organization
Organizational Information Security knowledge:
knowledge level of security topics (the other
constructs)
Security Self-efficacy: the end-users own selfconfidence to be and act securely
Policy, Governance, and Compliance: An
integrated approach used by corporations to act in
accordance with the guidelines set for each data and
system protection within given vertical markets.
Benign detrimental security behavior: Unintentional
behavior which could lead, or has led, to a security
event.

Operational measurement
End-user awareness of installed technology such as
firewalls, intrusion detection, access controls, and
other deployed tools.
End-user awareness of corporate security
environment. Is security an “all” corporate norm, or
the responsibility of few?
End-user understanding and knowledge of
organizational security tools and techniques.
End-user knowledge of how security tools work,
attack and defend techniques, and organizational
risk structure.
End-user knowledge of security policy & guidelines
that are deployed at a given organization

User survey response on behavioral practice in
information security
* End-user resistance to social engineering
* End-user data privacy, use of encryption
* End-user handling of virus/malware
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Background of the Study
Current research demonstrates that security is not simply a technology problem but is
primarily a people problem caused by malicious intent, carelessness, or accident (Desman,
2013; Kim, Lee, Chun, & Benbasat, 2014; Peltier, 2013; Whitman & Mattord, 2013). For
example, in January 2013, The Wall Street Journal reported on a malicious insider event by
which 150 million private records containing social security numbers, financial information,
and other private data had been stolen by four employees from the database servers of Dun
and Bradstreet and sold for profit (Chu, 2013). In another example of malicious insider
behavior leading to extreme data loss, DatalossDB.org (2014) reported that credentials for
104 million credit cards were stolen from the Korean Credit Bureau from inside employees
and were later used to purchase more than $20 million worth of goods. In an example of
accidental loss, the State of Texas released the social security numbers of 6.5 million
registered voters in 2012 (DatalossDB.org, 2013). In 2011, the Texas Comptroller of Public
Schools accidentally exposed 3.5 million teacher records that included salary, social security
numbers, and other sensitive data to the public Internet (Shannon, 2011). There are literally
thousands of such reports of data loss that range from small to large company security issues
(DatalossDB.org, 2013). In the majority of cases, data loss can be attributed to human error
or malicious intent (Spears & Barki, 2010). For this reason, research into the effectiveness of
ISA on end-users and the promotion of a cyber-secure working environment would prove
beneficial toward preventing such unfortunate occurrences.
Because information security can be rooted in human behavior (D’arcy et al., 2009), it
is subject to the psychological and sociological behavior of the people who are associated
with it (Ahmed et al., 2012). It is widely accepted that a strong ISA program solidifies the
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bridge between end-users and technology (Ahmad et al., 2012; Balcerek et al., 2012;
Desman, 2013). However, a company that has innovative technology and a good security
policy in place is still subject to the end-user’s willingness and ability to follow the policy
(Peltier, 2011). Even with the growing implementation of such policies, end-user operational
behavior remains the single greatest factor that increases information security risk (Alfawaz
et al., 2012; Crossler et al., 2013; Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2010). Therefore, understanding the
effectiveness of ISA in risk management and how it relates to human tendencies serves a
vital need in the modern, information-centric world.
End-user behavior can be broken into two broad categories: intentional and accidental
harm. One predictor of behavior that leads to both categories is the self-efficacy, or perceived
behavioral control, of the end-user to practice good security hygiene. Figure 2 outlines the
two-factor taxonomy of behavioral information security and illustrates that user expertise and
intent are critical factors in its success (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005).

Figure 2. Illustration of the intersection of security expertise and intention. Reprinted from
“Analysis of end user security behaviors,” by J. M. Stanton et al., 2005, Computers &
Security, 24(2), 124-133.
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This illustration demonstrates how a person’s level of experience and expertise can
promote certain intentions, running the gamut from intentional destruction to naïve mistakes.
Expertise and intention are both variables independent to the dependent variable (in)security.
Also in this illustration careful attention is paid to the level of loss, and the focus is on both
internal and external threats; an attacker who is expertly trained and malicious in intent
causes the most damage from intentional destruction. Therefore, perceived behavioral
control, or self-efficacy, is a critical determinant in estimating how human behavior relates to
ISA risk management.
By building on the research of psychosocial behavior (Stanton et al., 2005) and
leveraging established TPB tools (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), this
study aims to provide data to help mitigate security attacks through the illumination of
relevant human behavior. As mentioned previously, a construct of TPB is ATT, the attitude
that a person takes toward desired behavior. The concept of ATT can be seen in two separate
cases at the University of Washington Medical Center, with data loss stemming from both
benevolent and malicious intent (www.datalossdb.org, 2014). In the first issue, an employee
at a debt collection company working on behalf of the hospital intentionally, and maliciously,
violated security protocol and stole financial information from patient records. The individual
recorded patient credit card numbers as they were used for payment of services. In the second
case, at the same medical center, x-rays and patient DVDs were found in furniture sold at a
surplus auction and were determined to have accidentally been left behind by the previous
user of the desk. The person’s attitude toward security policies was diametrically opposed in
these cases, but the result was the same: loss of sensitive data. In the first case, the individual
may have adopted an attitude that the reward outweighed the penalty, in that sufficient
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punitive and/or technological deterrents were lacking in the company’s ISA policies. In the
second case, the individual’s low-level awareness of or concern for the consequences
resulted in a breach of ISA policies. Both cases illustrate fundamental attitudes toward
externally desired behavior, where social pressures conflict with subjective norms, and how
information security challenges can be met by predicting when such human behaviors are
likely to occur through ISA risk-management policies.
Importance of the Study
Data loss resulting from internal human sources is on the rise and must be studied from
all angles to mitigate it (Takebayashi et al., 2010). Data loss can lead to lost revenue, lost
jobs, lack of trust in essential digital processes, and even lost identity. Therefore,
understanding and investigating the causes of end-user behavior is critical to finding a
successful mitigation strategy for data loss. ISA is the widely accepted strategy for end-user
security behavior, and TPB is broadly accepted as a tool for predicting behavior (Ahmad et
al., 2012; Aurigemma & Panko, 2012; Whitman & Mattord, 2013). Thus, by using TPB to
understand the effectiveness of ISA programs, new security methods, frameworks,
technologies, and policies may be discovered to help mitigate worldwide data loss.
Statement of the Problem
The solution to preventing data loss comprises both technological and human factors.
Too-heavy reliance upon technological deterrents, as the demand for information and its
transmission has increased, has, in turn, increased the exposure of sensitive data to cyber
security risks. Since ISA programs are widely accepted as the primary tool for mitigating
end-user security risks, researching the effectiveness of ISA in developing appropriate enduser security behavior is critical to developing new security methods, frameworks,
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technologies, and policies.
Objective of the Study
The objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of ISA on end-user
security behavior using the TPB model in midsize corporations. Data loss is traditionally
viewed as a technically-oriented problem, but current research indicates that most data loss
events are rooted in human behavior (Alfawaz et al., 2010; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnil,
2014). Research on end-user security behavior (ESB) is prevalent in the security field
(Altawaz et al., 2010; Balcerek et al., 2012; Stanton et al., 2005; Takebayashi et al., 2010;
Tamjidyamcholo et al., 2013), but knowledge of the effectiveness of ISA on ESB is
incomplete and deserves exploration.
The resulting data will help form new security frameworks, policies, training regimes,
and tools for measuring the effectiveness of ISA on ESB in midsize organizations.
Research Questions
1. How effective are ISA programs in influencing end-user security intention (SI)?
2. To what extent does attitude (ATT) toward ISA programs significantly influence SI?
3. To what extent does the subjective norm (SN) of ISA programs significantly influence
SI?
4. To what extent does perceived behavioral control (PBC) of ISA significantly influence
SI?
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Research Hypotheses
H0: There is no significant relationship between ISA and security behavior.
H1: There is a significant relationship between ISA and security behavior.
H2a. There is a positive relationship between end-users’ perceived ease of use of ISA and
the attitude toward security behavior.
H2b. There is a positive relationship between the end-users’ perceived usefulness of ISA
and the attitude toward security behavior.
H3a There is a significant relationship between the end-users perceived peer influence on
ISA and the attitude toward security behavior.
H3b There is a significant relationship between the end-users perceived supervisor
influence on ISA and the attitude toward security behavior.
H4 There is a significant influence of ISA ATT on end-user intention (behavior)
H5 There is a significant influence of ISA SN on end-user intention (behavior)
H6 There is a significant influence of ISA PBC on end-user intention (behavior)
Figure 3 illustrates the constructs of TPB and they will be applied in this study of the
effectiveness of ISA on secure behavior. Ease of use and perceived usefulness are both
antecedents to attitude. Peer and supervisor influence are antecedents to subjective norm.
ISA self-efficacy and tool self-efficacy are both antecedents to behavioral control (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Davis, 1989).
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Assumptions
1. Individuals responding to the survey will answer honestly.
2. Security mangers will provide honest data on security programs and training within
their respective organizations.
3. The expert panel will be unbiased and participate openly and honestly.
Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations. All aspects of security behavior could not be fully encompassed in this
research due to the breadth of topic. Thus, caution should be used as to the generalization of
this research. Fatigue may play a factor in the survey response, so the number of survey
questions was held to a minimum. Another issue is that end-users may not be willing to share
information about their security intentions (Straub, 1986).
Delimitations. To make the data collected more manageable, a Likert scale was used,
and open-ended questions will be avoided. The study cannot be generalized, as the survey
population is a single company.
Definitions
Access: An end-user’s ability to use, manipulate, modify, or affect another subject or
object. Authorized users have legal access to a system, whereas hackers have illegal
access to a system. Access controls regulate this ability (Whitman & Mattord,
2011).
Asset: The company resource that is being protected. An asset can be logical ( a
website, information, data) or physical (i.e., a person, computer system, or other
tangible object). Assets, and particularly information assets, are the focus of security
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efforts; they are what those efforts are attempting to protect.
Attack: An intentional or unintentional act that can cause damage to, or otherwise
compromise, information and/or the systems that support it. Attacks can be active
or passive, intentional or unintentional, and direct or indirect.
Best practice: A norm accepted as the best method for accomplishing an information
system objective.
Defense-in-depth: Best practice method for layering information technology hardware,
software, policy, and people in an effort to mitigate the risk of data loss.
End-user: The person by whom hardware or software technology solutions are designed to
be used.
Exploit: A technique used to compromise a system. This term can be a verb or a noun.
Threat agents may attempt to exploit a system or other information asset by using it
illegally for their personal gain, or an exploit can be a documented process to take
advantage of a vulnerability or exposure, usually in software, that is either inherent in
the software or is created by the attacker.
Exposure: A condition or state of being exposed. In information security, exposure exists
when a vulnerability known to an attacker is present.
Information Security: An official organizational program with the goal of training users
about the potential threats to an organization's information and how to avoid and
behave in these situations.
Information Security Awareness: A formal process for educating end-users about computer
security and organizational security practice. A good security awareness program
should educate end-users about specific expectations and behaviors that they are held
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accountable for.
Internal Security Event: A change from the operational norm of information systems or
services that is identified as a violation of a security policy, safeguard, or technology.
Loss: An unintended instance of an information asset suffering damage through unauthorized
modification or disclosure.
Organizational Information Security Awareness/Culture: The security postures, policies, and
culture of an organization.
Organizational Information Security Knowledge: The knowledge level of an organization’s
security topics and its specific training in risk mitigation.
Organizational Information Security Technology Deployed: Hardware/software tools used
to mitigate security events
Protection Profile or Security Posture: The entire set of controls and safeguards, including
policy, education, training and awareness, and technology that an organization
implements (or fails to implement) to protect the asset.
Risk: The probability that something unwanted will happen. Companies must minimize risk
to match their risk appetite—the quantity and nature of risk the organization is willing
to accept.
Security Self-efficacy: The end-users’ own self-confidence to be secure and act in a secure
manner.
Subjects and Objects: A computer can be either the subject of an attack (an agent entity
used to conduct the attack) or the object of an attack (the target entity).
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB): A psychological tool used to predict an individual's
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intention to engage in a behavior at a specific time and place. It is built on the
following constructs:

1. Attitude toward behavior (ATT) is a measure of how important the behavior in
question is to the individual.
2. Subjective norm (SN) is a social measurement that examines the social burden
to perform or not perform the behavior.
3. Perceived behavior control (PBC) is built upon Bandura’s tested and proven
theory of perceived self-efficacy being a key foundation to behavior (Ajzen,
1985; Bandura, 1977).
Threat: A category of objects, persons, or other entities that presents a danger to an asset.
Threats are always present and can be purposeful or undirected. For example, hackers
purposefully threaten unprotected information systems, while severe storms
incidentally threaten buildings and their contents.
Vulnerability: A weakness or fault in a system that opens it to attack or damage.
Summary
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the research that encompasses the study. It consists of
the purpose of the study, the importance and significance of the study, the research
questions/hypothesizes, and research objectives. This section also provided brief information
about ISA and TPB. This study will define the role ISA plays in security behavior, thus
allowing the development of new security frameworks, tools, and research to mitigate
security events.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this literature review is to summarize the existing research closely
related to the research aim of this study. Data loss at the hand of internal end-users in midsize
companies is increasing (Alfawaz et al., 2010; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnil, 2014) and is
usually combated with information security awareness (ISA) programs (Brdiczka et al.,
2012; Crossler et al., 2013; Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron, 2016; Hsu et al., 2015). To study the
effectiveness of ISA on behavior, the research was constructed around the theory of planned
behavior (TPB).
Information Security Awareness (ISA)
The creation of information security policies, standards, procedures, and guidelines is
only the beginning of an effective information security program. Technology plays a role but
is not as effective as a trained work force (Brdiczka et al., 2012; Crossler et al., 2013; Hsu et
al., 2015; Dhillon et al., 2016). A well-built technical security architecture will be rendered
less effective if there is no process in place to make certain that the end-users are made aware
of their responsibilities with regard to information assets (Crossler et al., 2013). An ISA
program encompasses end-user awareness, education, and training programs to address
security practices, policies, and tools.
Security policy is the bedrock of an ISA program as it establishes practice, sets
boundaries, and creates desired behavior. In most organizations, security policy guidelines
and implementations are the responsibility of the information technology (IT) department
and often a security executive. In particular, a security policy consists of a set of rules and
practices that control how an organization protects and distributes its key information assets,
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striking a balance between security and usability (Safa et al., 2012). According to Peltier
(2013), a good security policy dictates user responsibility, threat reporting, identification of
key information security personal, and deterrents for violations. Specifically, Peltier offers
the following five major components of a good security and risk management policy:
1. Physical Security
a. Offices secured
b. Desks and cabinets secured
c. Workstations secured
d. Information secured following CIA practice
2. Roles and Responsibilities
a. Who has responsibility for what
b. What is expected of end-users
c. How do different groups within the organization interact
(communication plan)
d. Spell out accountabilities
3. Technical Securities
a. Wireless security
b. Wired security
c. Virtual private networks
d. Access control
e. Identity management
f. Virus/Malware protection
g. Secure application architecture
i. Email security
ii. Web application security
iii. Privacy policy
h. Vendor security
i. Firewall IDS/IPS management
4. Incident management
a. Incident response
b. Network security monitoring and policy enforcement
c. Data classification
d. Acceptable use policy
e. Communication plan
5. Deterrent
a. Training and education
b. Violation schedule
c. Access alarms
d. Due diligence reporting of suspicious activity
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Security policy is used to create the culture of security for an organization and establishes the
ISA (Alhogail, 2015; Hassan, 2015; Kearney & Kruger, 2016). From the ISA, both desired
end-user security behavior and undesired misbehavior is accounted for.
Security Misbehavior
Security misbehavior can be broadly defined as the set of end-users who violate
organizational security policy, which leads to the loss of organizational assets. Users who
engage in intentional misbehavior are either out for profit and/or destruction and are labeled
intentional malicious insiders. End-users who unintentionally neglect to follow policy and
engage in behaviors that result in asset loss or risk are categorized as unintentional insider
threats (Whitman & Mattord, 2011).
Inappropriate modification of data, altering access to data and the availability of
systems, copying software, selling organizational IP property, and stealing corporate data as
they leave for other jobs are a few examples of intentional undesired behaviors. While a
strong ISA program won’t bring these behaviors to a 100% stop, a weak ISA program could
lead to such behavior (Siponen, 2014). Unintentional undesired behavior such as
understanding and being capable of following security policy and practice but failing to do so
can also lead to loss of organizational assets (Guo, 2010). Unintentional undesired behavior
can also be caused by lack of knowledge or efficacy. At the core of both intentional and
unintentional loss, a weak ISA program can usually be found. Conversely, security-trained
and educated end-users who have a clear understanding of their responsibilities help to create
a strong ISA (Peltier, 2013; Tsohou et al., 2015; Vroom & Solms, 2004).
In the literature on security, several terms have been proposed to describe “bad”
behaviors that are regarded undesirable and “good” behaviors that are seen as desired from
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an organizational perspective. Such terms include compliance, governance, computer abuse,
hacking, system misuse, and inappropriate computer use (Guo, 2010). Desired behaviors are
the aim of ISA programs, since they represent actions that are deemed beneficial to the
organization. Reporting security policy violations and following security policy are two such
desired behaviors related to compliance (Ghaisas et al., 2015; Hendre & Joshi, 2015; Vance
& Siponen, 2012). End-users must understand their roles and responsibilities in protecting
organizational assets and how to respond to any potential threat. To make this undertaking
easier, ISA programs should focus on educating and training users on how to effectively
protect information assets.
This study to evaluated the effectiveness of ISA programs are in predicting desired
behavior. The literature review illustrated that the common tool to mitigate human security
issues is an ISA. This study then examined exactly how ISA programs can be a predictor of
behavior using TPB.
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)
TPB has long been accepted as a framework and proven successful in predicting and
explaining behavior across multiple domains of study. It examines attitude, norm, and control
as determinants for an individual’s intention to perform a specific behavior (Ajzen, 1980,
1985). TPB was extended from the theory of reasoned action and proposes three constructs
of intention (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975):
TPB construct 1: Attitude toward Behavior, Perceived Usefulness / Ease of use
According to Davis (1989), people have many reasons to use or decline information
technology. They may choose to use technology if they believe it will help them with
their work: a so-called “perceived usefulness.” On the other hand, people may find
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technology to be useful but difficult to use and balk before its daunting “ease of use.”
Both determinants (i.e. “perceived usefulness” and “ease of use”) serve to influence
an end-user’s attitude and behavior concerning technology. Liaw and Huang (2013)
applied the theory of perceived usefulness to the adoption of e-learning environments.
In their study, they found that the more difficult an interface was to e-learning, the
less likely students were to follow complete instruction sets. They also used ease of
use as a functionality to investigate self-regulating behavior and e-learning.
TPB construct 2: Subjective norm, Peer/Supervisor social pressure
Cheng et al. (2013) studied the impact of social control and deterrence theory on
security violations within an organization. Their research found that social pressure
exerted by subjective norms influenced employee security policy violations and can
be in the form of peer or supervisor pressure. This finding was similar to the findings
of Ifinedo (2013), who found that social bonds formed at work have tremendous
influence on security policy compliance and subjective norms.
TPB Construct 3: Perceived Behavioral Control, An individual’s self-evaluation of ease
toward performing a particular behavior
Johnston et al. (2016) researched security behaviors in organizations and found PBC
to have a major influence on security compliance. Users were asked about following
security policy for their organization, and a significant cross-section of the 317
workers questioned reported that they lacked the confidence to follow every security
policy. The researchers then provided a fictional case study and discovered, with
statistical significance, that these same people lacking confidence also failed to follow
security policy in some cases.
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Attitude Toward Behavior (ATT)
ATT is the TPB construct that measures an individual’s judgment of the importance
of a particular behavior. The research in this study focuses on the end-user ATT of an ISA
program and the behaviors that lead to compliance of information security guidelines,
practices, and policies. Current behavioral research in information security relies heavily on
attitude as a precursor to behavior.
Hu, Kuamg, Lu, and Wu (2014) used ATT in the study of software piracy in China
and the United States. The hypothesis of the research was that the attitude toward software
privacy was positively related to piracy intent. Specifically, they analyzed software cost,
punishment severity, and punishment certainty as antecedents to attitudes that subsequently
contribute to intent. Not only did the study find that the antecedents influence attitude, but
they also found that attitude had the largest influence on piracy intent.
Siponen, Mahmood, and Pahinila (2014) performed a field study that found that
security compliance was positively influenced by attitude and that attitude could be
cultivated into a culture by executive-level influence.
The technology acceptance model (TAM) holds two constructs that are clear
antecedents to ATT. Perceived ease of use, which is defined as the user’s perceived level of
effort needed in a given system, and perceived usefulness, which is defined as the level at
which a user perceives a system would enhance job performance (David, 1989). Chueng and
Vogel (2013) used an extension of TAM to predict a user’s behavioral acceptance of
collaborative technologies.
Subjective Norm (SN)
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SN refers to the perceived social pressures to carry out or not perform a given action
(Ajzen, 1985). ISA programs depend upon creating a culture of security behavior for their
success, stemming from executives and supervisors insisting on and prioritizing appropriate
security behavior (Aurigemma & Panko, 2012). Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, and
Boss (2009) developed a model to explain end-user information security behavior. They
found that when end-users perceive security policies to be mandatory, the motivation to
adopt good security behavior increases. They also noted that if end-users believe
organizational leaders are monitoring their actions, they will be more likely to comply. This
shows how SN pressure and culture, promoted by the watchful direction of proactive
supervisors, can change the perspectives of end-users who may be somewhat apathetic to
information security.
Top management thus plays a proactive role in end-user compliance to security
policies and organizational culture (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012). The research done
here illustrates the impact that SN and PBC can have on end-user intentions. Ifinedo (2012)
surveyed 124 business managers and information system professionals and found that PBC,
ATT, and SN positively influenced end-user security policy compliance.
Self-Efficacy (SE) or Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC)
Perceived behavioral control as defined by TPB can be measured in self-efficacy (SE)
(Ajzen 1980, 1985). SE theory has been applied to understand the process of gaining and the
importance of confidence in many domains of behavior such as learning, achievement, career
choice, and the ability to persevere through tough situations (Bandura 1977, 1982, 1986,
1989, 2006). Bandura (1986) uses an understanding of SE to formulate his social cognitive
theory and argues that behavior is composed of positive and negative reinforcement,

24
modeling the behavior of others, and self-correction built upon performance feedback
(Bandura, 1977). Motivation to complete a task is embedded in cognitive activity and
behavior due to the individual’s perception of the future consequences of the action (1989).
This cognitive activity is stated as SE, which is defined as “the conviction that one can
successfully execute the behavior required to produce the [desired] outcomes” (1977).
Individuals with a strong sense of efficacy are more likely to challenge themselves
with difficult tasks and be intrinsically motivated (Bandura, 1986; Margolis & Cabe, 2006).
These individuals will put forth a high degree of effort in order to meet their obligations and
rebound quickly from setbacks, which makes them more likely to achieve personal goals. On
the other hand, individuals with low self-efficacy believe that they cannot be successful.
They are less likely to put forth a rigorous, prolonged effort and may consider challenging
tasks as threats to be ignored. Since every person has goals or improvements that they wish
to make, self-efficacy would appear to be a universal promoter of successful change and
action; beyond skills and knowledge, an individual must believe with confidence that a given
action will return a desired result and that he or she is capable of performing the action
(Bandura, 1977; Caprara, Vecchione, Alessandri, Gerbino, & Barbaranelli, 2011; McKeachie
& Svinicki, 2013).
Furthermore, cognitive social theory suggests that successful experiences influence the
sense of efficacy, belief, and behavior; in general, successful experience increases SE and
negative experience decreases SE (Bandura, 1986). Within the context of information
security, negative experiences would include lost data, inability to remove malware, being a
victim of a phishing ploy, and fraud. Positive experiences could include avoiding a phishing
scam, encrypting data, and managing the integrity of data.
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Additionally, general controllability is also a factor in SE. In information security, this
can be seen in the end-users’ beliefs that an organization adequately deploys technology to
protect data from harm (Rhee et al., 2009). In other words, end-users’ SE will increase when
they believe that the organization for which they work has adequate security practices and
technologies in place to protect their data. Conversely, end-user SE decreases when the
opposite is true.
It is important to understand the difference between ability and capability in order to
understand SE. Ability is a derivative of the Latin word skillful, which means to be currently
able (Bandura, 2006; Vygotsky, 1980). Ability refers to proficiency in doing a skill that has
already been attained. Therefore, SE for current ability is called “self-efficacy for
performance,” which is a confidence that one can do a particular task right now. On the
contrary, capability refers to the potential to perform a future function not yet learned. Both
capability and ability are key ingredients influenced by SE but distinctively different in
meaning. For an information security awareness program to be completely successfully, endusers need ability and capability. In ISA both are encouraged through education, training, and
organizational culture.
Mahatma Gandi (1939) captured SE and the difference between ability and capability
by stating simply, “If I have the belief that I can do it, I shall surely acquire the capacity to do
it even if I may not have it at the beginning.” SE is centered on perceived capability or a can
do perspective, while intention is a statement of will do. Simply stated, SE is one’s own
confidence to complete a given task (Bandura, 2006). This research studied the influence that
end-user SE has on ISA risk management programs and security behavior.
Many have learned the power of “I think I can!” from Watty Piper’s (1930) The Little
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Engine That Could or, as Henry Ford (n.d.) stated, “Whether you think you can or can’t,
you’re usually right.” Both sources are seminal reminders of the power of SE to bring both
positive and negative results; individuals with higher levels of SE possess a strong sense of
conviction about their abilities to achieve goals (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). Much research
has been done in many different disciplines using Bandura’s social cognitive theory and SE,
including motivation to learn (Zimmerman, 2000), computer use (Compeau & Higgins,
1995), weight loss motivation (Armitage, Norman, Noor, Alganem, & Arden, 2014), and
information security (Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009), to name a few. Bandura (1977) was very
careful to illustrate that a specific domain, such as security self-efficacy (SSE), must be
identified in order to successfully measure self-efficacy and behavior.
Computer Self-Efficacy (CSE) and Security Self-Efficacy (SSE) Domains
Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1989) first combined Bandura’s theories of self-efficacy
and social cognitive theory to computer usage and defined CSE as a person’s own judgment
of his or her capability to use a computer. Bandura (1986) pointed out in his research that
mastery of a task develops positive SE, whereas failure contributes to reduced SE. Much
research has been built upon the CSE theory developed by Davis et al. (1989), such as user
adoption of social networks (Lee & Suh, 2013), dissemination of innovative computer
technology (Rogers, 2010), and general technology acceptance (Holden & Karsh, 2010).
Using a Likert scale, Compeau and Higgins (1995) developed a tool that has been
used by multiple researchers to drive self-efficacy-based studies. Vankatesh, Brown, and
Bala (2003) used it to do work on user acceptance of information technology; Maynard,
Rapp, and Gilson (2010) used the CSE model to investigate global virtual team effectiveness;
and Tan and Teo (2000) constructed a research framework identifying CSE factors that
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influence the use of internet banking. More recently, Huffman, Whetten, and Huffman (2013)
used CSE to study gender roles and technology acceptance in higher education, while
Tamjidyamcholo, Bin Baba, Tamjid, and Gholipour (2013) used it to study the role that
knowledge-sharing plays on information security within virtual communities.
Without due consideration of the specific domain to be studied, many researchers make
the error of reusing existing instruments and fail to recognize that general CSE is inadequate
for specialized domains (Marakas, Johnson, & Clay, 2007). Thus, it is imperative to this
study to narrow the specific domain to computer security self-efficacy (SSE). SSE is defined
as an end-user’s confidence in complying with organizational risk mitigation strategies and
behavior within the boundaries of good security hygiene (Clarke, 2010; Rhee, Ki, & Ryu,
2009). Because Bandura’s social cognitive theory is founded on self-regulating motivation
and behavior models, it is well matched for investigating the behaviors individuals have in
the field of information security (Rhee et al., 2009). SSE is a new domain that has grown
from CSE and extends security research in a new direction (Clarke, 2010). Understanding
SSE and the motivational drivers that inspire the confidence in appropriate behavior is
critical to the mitigation of security risk.
Rhee et al. (2009) created a variable called self-efficacy in information security (SEIS)
to conduct a study using social cognitive theory. The net result of the research showed that
merely listing expected behaviors and associated penalties for creating security risk will have
a limited impact on effective security mitigation techniques. The authors defined security
practice as an individual’s two-faceted information security risk management behavior. The
first was the individual’s use of security software such as anti-virus, anti-malware, and other
security tools. The second facet revolved around compliant behavior regarding computer and
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Internet use. For them, compliance wasn’t governed, referring exclusively to voluntary
security behaviors. Examples include the user’s willingness to use secure passwords and
back up critical data. Their research proceeded from and answered (in italics) the following
hypotheses:
H1a: Individuals with higher SEIS use more security protection software.
H1b: Individuals with higher SEIS demonstrate more security-conscious behavior.
SEIS significantly influenced users’ use of security software and user security
behavior.
H2: Individuals with higher SEIS have greater intention to exert more effort to
strengthen their information security.
SEIS demonstrated a significant positive relationship with intention to
strengthen security effort. Users with higher SEIS were more likely to exert
high levels of effort to enhance information security.
H3a: The greater one’s experience with a computer and the Internet, the higher is
his or her SEIS.
H3b: Security incidents lower SEIS.
Prior experiential influence with SEIS had a positive influence on security.
Also, experience with security breaches had a direct negative effect upon SEIS.
Both H3a and H3b were found to be true.
H4: As one perceives that information security threats are controllable, his or her own
self-efficacy toward information security increases.
The perception that security threats are controllable was found to
significantly increase SEIS.

This research into information security seeks to build mainly upon the tenets of Bandura and
Rhee et al.’s research.
Marlon Clarke (2010) studied an individual’s ability to use encrypted email as his
specific measurement in the self-efficacy domain of SSE in his dissertation, The Role of SelfEfficacy in Computer Security Behavior: Developing the Construct of Computer Security
Self-Efficacy. He also studied other significant factors related to SSE and established their
validity through an expert panel. Building upon Clarke’s work, new research can be done to
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identify the necessary precursors to SSE and user security behavior. Specifically, Clarke’s
tool can be used to measure behavioral constructs relevant to information security such as
social engineering, data privacy, virus/malware confidence, security circumvention, data
integrity, and intellectual property espionage. Clarke’s method is built upon the CSE method
developed by Compeau and Higgins (1995) but within the specific domain of SSE.
Other Behavioral Theories
Several other behavioral theories were reviewed that could be applied to information
security:
• The protection motivation theory focuses on the conditions under which appeals to fear
may influence behavior. The theory works off of the human need for self-preservation
in the face of threats, their severity, the perceived probability of the event, efficacy of
the recommended preventative behavior, and perceived self-efficacy (Rogers, 1975).
• Deterrence theory comes from a criminal research background and was used by D’arcy
et al. (2009) to statistically confirm a perceived certainty and severity of
organizational sanctions in order to reduce information security misuse.
• Self-determination theory is a motivational theory that describes an intrinsic human
tendency to make choices without external input (Deci & Ryan, 2012). Wall, Palvia,
and Lowry (2013) used self-determination theory as one factor in explaining
intrinsically-driven behavior within autonomous actions in the field of information
security; organizations produce security controls to mitigate harmful autonomous
actions while encouraging helpful autonomous actions.
• Rational choice theory (RCT) has its background in criminology but can be applied to
the field of information security. Vance and Siponen (2012) used RCT to investigate
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how an end-user decides to commit a security violation. Ajzen’s theory of reasonable
action (TRA) was also considered, but the major significance that self-efficacy lent to
TRA was to form TPB as a critical component of this research (Madden, Ellen, &
Ajzen, 1992).
Within an ISA program, the principles of protection motivation, self-determination,
deterrence, and rational choice theories can all be found. In the form of security policy
violation penalties and fear of job loss, the underpinnings of deterrence and protection
motivation can be found. In the training for acceptable use policies, roles/responsibilities, and
incident response, self-determination and rational choice behaviors are formed. As these
components are part of the larger ISA, the TPB represents the best fit to measure the
effectiveness of the ISA on behavior and also aids in avoiding confounding variables.
ISA Research
Information awareness programs are a critical component of overall information
security; technology without ISA is not a fully encompassed plan. The universality of
information systems (IS’s), along with the ever-increasing need for the systems to be
ubiquitous, has resulted in amplified vulnerability to risk. As a result, organizations have
advocated for more defensive ISA programs (Mejias, 2012). ISA is commonly defined as an
organizational process that aims at educating end-users in its procedures regarding the
protection of the digital assets (Takebayashi, Tsuda, Hasebe, & Masuoka, 2013; Wheeler &
Swick, 2011; Whitman & Mattord, 2011). As the word awareness implies, an ISA program is
designed to create an organizational culture of proactive secure computing. In the ongoing
effort to secure digital assets, the end-user occupies the role of both friend and foe. Security
awareness is a process that seeks to change individual perceptions, values, attitudes,
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behavior, norms, work habits, and organizational culture and structures in order to secure
vital personal information (Tsohou et al., 2015).
Predicting end-user behavior within the domain of information technology has been
accomplished in multiple studies (Cheung & Vogel, 2013; Kahn et al., 2011; Mathieson,
1991; Safa et al., 2015). Mathieson’s (1991) was one of the first studies that sought to predict
end-user intention in the context of information systems. In his research, he compared the
technology acceptance model (TAM) and TPB for their ability to predict user intention and
how such intention translates into behavior. The research found that both models can be used
to predict intention but that TPB provided more specific information. Ifinedo (2012) used the
TPB constructs of self-efficacy, attitude, subjective norms, and perceived control, combined
with the protection motivational theory, to discover if they positively influence compliance
with security policy. Wilson and Warkentin (2013) used TPB to illustrate that deterrence
alone is not enough to curb intentional employee computer abuse and that TPB can be used
as a predictor, or antecedent, of behavior. Nasri and Charfeddine (2012) studied the
behavioral adoption of Internet banking in Tunisia using TPB and TAM, which confirmed
the efficacy of the two theories in measuring the problem.
Summary
This chapter was dedicated to developing and supporting Ajzen’s theory of planned
behavior as a useful tool for measuring the effectiveness of ISA programs on end-user
behavior. The three constructs of PBC, ATT, and SN were explained using prior research
examples. Last, examples of research using TPB were provided to illustrate its pertinence to
the research done in this dissertation.
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Chapter III: Methods
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methods that were employed to
study the effectiveness of ISA programs on end-user security behavior. The chapter will
discuss the specific steps in the research: research design, population and sample,
instrumentation development and design, data collection, data analysis, validation, personnel,
budget, and timeline.
Research Design
The research was designed in concert with the organization being studied in order to
best protect the respondents and the organization. Another goal of involving the organization
was to certify that the data collected would be of later use to their decision-making. The
following is a listing of the research design:
1) Sign MOU with organization (appendix A).
2) Develop a survey based upon current research and the literature review.
3) Review questions with a dissertation committee.
4) Review questions with expert panel.
5) Meet and discuss logistics and the survey with the organization.
6) Adjust questions as needed (final copy appendix B).
7) Place questions into an online survey tool.
8) Organization will forward survey link to staff on my behalf (appendix C).
9) Human subjects review (approval in appendix D)
10) Respondents will be given one week to take the survey. A reminder went out on
day 4.
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11) Data review.
12) Findings and conclusions.
13) Defend dissertation. Upon approval, present/discuss findings with study
organization.
Population and Sample
The target population for this study met the Gartner Group definition of a midsize
organization (Gartner, 2014). The company in this study has multiple locations,
approximately 400 end-users, and revenue of more than $50 million (but less than $1 billion)
all under one leadership organization. An ISA program is in place at the company, and
respondents who indicated that they had not been organizationally security-trained were
removed from the study. The survey population was randomly sampled from a 400 end-user
pool. Participant demographic data was classified according to gender, tenure at organization,
education, years of computing experience, and other non-identifying background
information.
Human Subject Approval
This study sampled a midsize organization in order to study ISA and its behavioral
effects. Since the study concerned human behavior, it required review and approval of the
EMU Human Subjects Review. The survey contains a very clear consent form, and sample
respondents will take it of their own free will (appendix E). Any data that identify the
participant or organization will not be collected, since anonymity is critical to the research.
To further protect the respondents, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed with
the study organization (appendix A). The data were encrypted in processing, transfer, and at
rest.
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Data Collection/Analysis
The survey will be delivered electronically via SurveyMonkey®, a web-based
collection tool. The collected data will then be placed into the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis. The imported data will then be vetted to remove
nonresponsive answers and respondents who had not had security training. The constructs
analyzed in the next section were designed to confirm reliability and validity. A cover letter
was included with the survey URL to instruct respondents on their roles, assure them
anonymity, and explain the research goals as they relate to data collection.
Validation
According to Straub (1989), instrument validation consists of content validity,
construct validity, and reliability. As stated by Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen (2004),
“Without solid validation of the tools that are used to gather data on which findings and
interpretations are based, the very scientific basis of the profession is threatened.” The
following portions of this section will explain how this study has met these standards.
Content validity is defined as providing adequate coverage of the subject being
studied. This includes measuring the correct items to form constructs that meet the study
question (Polit & Beck, 2006). The operational validity of the experimentation was illustrated
by a complete literature review and past research. To provide more validity, the survey was
presented and altered based upon feedback from two outside sources. The first step was
meeting with the organization’s Vice President of Technology and Security. This meeting
was two-pronged: first, to ensure that the organization was comfortable with the questions
asked, and second, to ensure that the survey gathers information that is relevant and helpful
to the company. The panel and the organization had similar feedback, as both felt that the
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survey measured security awareness and that a few of the questions were invalid since
employees had no choice but to comply. For example, in one instance the survey asked if the
respondent would use complex passwords when, in fact, the installed system does this by
default. Consequently, the question was changed to “I am capable of guarding passwords as
guided by my organization.” Two members of the panel mentioned that a similar study on
security situational awareness would also be helpful and could be included in the study.
However, it was decided to not extend the study and to save that research for another time.
Such characteristics provided the study with content validity (Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen,
2004). Panel comments can be found in table 2 below.
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Table 2
Listing of Security Panel Comments

Expert 1

Expert 2

Expert 3

Expert 4

Expert 5

Title
Data Security Analyst,
Senior

Partial listing of comments
• Some questions out of date
• Should mobile security be included
• Remove questions that corporate
security should handle
• Long survey
• Definitions of ISA are accurate
Adjunct Professor IA; 15
• Questions do capture ISA
years corporate experience
• Questions on survey response (did
not know survey was electronic
delivery)
• Questions are direct an easily read
Security Analyst
• Should you ask if people follow
security guidance because it’s the
right thing to do?
• “Shadow IT” – are people working
around security policy/tools
because it’s too difficult
• Agrees ISA is captured in
questions
Security Engineer
• Agrees ISA is captured in
questions
• Would like to see a match between
ISA and actual performance
• Agrees questions are readable
Senior Information
• Agrees survey items will measure
Security Intelligence and
ISA
Forensics
• Perhaps more focus on policy and
policy awareness could be done

Construct validity is defined as how accurately the experimental method measures the
subject of the study. It is paramount that the items that form a construct have high
interrelatedness, or internal consistency. A commonly accepted measure of internal
consistency is Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, when alpha registers 0.7 or above (Park & Chen,
2007; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Before executing Cronbach’s alpha analysis, corrections
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were made to reverse-code items that were negatively worded so that a high value indicated
the same type of response for every item. Table 3 illustrates that there were reliability
problems with the survey, as Cronbach’s alpha scores that are marked in orange were not
acceptable; removing an item from perceived supervisor influence increased internal
consistency.
Table 3
Cronbach Alpha Test for Reliability

Other tests for reliability, such as test-retest or inter-rater, were not applicable to this
study. A pilot study would have highlighted the issue and provided an opportunity to finetune the instrument. While this will be discussed in further detail in the results portion of this
document, it is important to note that while the lack of reliability in the research method will
result in the failure of one research goal, it does not impact the other. The first research goal
of creating an overarching method to measure the effectiveness of ISA programs on end-user
security behavior will need further prior research before release. The second research goal of
studying the same question within a single organization can still be answered by combining
the antecedents in each construct. The newly created variable will have seven items in
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common instead of four, and reliability increases because the antecedents are closely related.
Table 4 illustrates the combined antecedent scores.
Table 4
Combined Antecedent Cronbach Alpha Scores

Personnel, Budget, and Timeline
The personnel for this study included the expert panel of security professionals, the
committee, and the investigator. The cost of SurveyMonkey® was $26/month for the data
storage of 400 responses, and this represented the only out-of-pocket expense
(www.surveymonkey.com, 2016).
Summary
This chapter presented the overall research procedures and the development of the
survey. The survey was discussed in depth and was adapted from extant research. Reliability
and validity were discussed and proven acceptable after minor changes.
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Chapter IV: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the detailed statistical analysis collected in the
research survey tool. The data were pre-screened for reliability and validity in Chapter III;
thus, this section will start with quantitative data analysis. The survey was administered
through an online tool and investigated the effects of information security awareness on enduser security behavior in a midsize company. The survey was reviewed by an expert panel
composed of several information security experts. The survey population was composed of
full-time employees at a local midsize company. The survey was available for response over
a one-week period. The organization has requested anonymity in this process.
Normality
Skewness and kurtosis were analyzed to review for normally distributed data and to
ensure data statistical assumptions are acceptable (Grinnekk & Unrau, 2005). Using SPSS
and the formulas in Figure 4, the test results revealed that some of the data in the main study
were skewed outside the normal range of -1 and 1 (Mrdia, 1970). Further, kurtosis of items
also ranged outside the acceptable range -1.96 and 1.96 to achieve p < 0.05 (NCBI, 2016).

Figure 4. Formulas for skewness and kurtosis.
There were five items in total that needed to be transformed. To address these issues,
transformations of affected variables were performed using Box-Cox so that assumptions of
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normality would be acceptable when conducting data analyses (Kline, 2011). After testing
for normal distribution in the transformed items, skewness and kurtosis were all acceptable.
This is illustrated in table 5 and figure 5 below.
Table 5
Transformed Data

N
Valid
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis

SN
99
-0.166
0.243
0.832
0.481

PBC
99
0.236
0.243
-0.453
0.481

ATT
99
-0.019
0.243
-0.147
0.481
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Figure 5. Histogram images of data distribution.
Completion Rates
The survey was provided to a population of 400 professionals who work with digital
data on a daily basis, and only voluntary involvement was expected. The survey link and
request was sent from a source internal to the organization so that participants were aware of
it being a legitimate request. A copy of the letter can be found in Appendix C. One hundred
and nine individuals responded to the survey; however, ten skipped questions or answered
that they had not received corporate security training. As the study focuses on the effects of
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information security training on secure end user behavior, security training is a key
measurement 99/400 or 24.75%.
Demographics
This study collected the following demographic characteristics: age, gender, and
education level. In discussion with the Vice President of Technology and Security, a key
demographic item was learned. All employees work with digital data on a daily basis as each
employee is assigned a computer upon start date. Tables 6 and 7 below illustrate
demographic data of the respondents to the survey.
Table 6
Demographic Information, Gender, and Age Frequency Report
What is your gender?
Frequency
Valid

Valid

Female
Male
Total

Percent

60
60.6
39
39.4
99
100
What is your age?

19-30
31-40
41-50
50-60
60 and above
Total

Frequency

Percent

15
25
26
20
13
99

15.2
25.3
26.3
20.2
13.1
100

Cumulative
Percent
60.6
100

Cumulative
Percent
15.2
40.4
66.7
86.9
100
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Table 7
Demographic Information, Education Report
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Cumulative
Frequency
Percent
Percent
Graduated
11
11.1
11.1
from high
school
Valid
Graduated
from 2-year
3
3
14.1
college
Graduated
36
36.4
50.5
from college
Completed
graduate
49
49.5
100
school

The remainder of item level frequencies can be found in Appendix F.
Data Analysis
Multiple linear regression (MLR) was used to test the relationships between the
independent variables and the dependent variable. Studies have found that Likert scales, such
as the instrument in this study, can be analyzed using parametric procedures under certain
conditions. The scale has to be a true Likert scale and thus made of multiple items that all
measure the same construct. Skewness and kurtosis must also be addressed and proven to be
within acceptable levels. Thus, when these constraints are met, parametric statistical
procedures can be used (Lix, Keselman, & Keselman, 1996; Lubke & Muthen, 2004; Choehn
et al., 2013).
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Figure 6. The corrected reliable hypothesis table (antecedents changed for validity).

H: There is a significant relationship between ISA and security behavior.
H0: There is no significant relationship between ISA and security behavior.
The first model created was used to measure the effect of ISA SN, ATT, and PBC on
secure behavior. The constructs were composed of multiple items using a five-scale response
level. Tables 7 and 8 show the outcome of the analysis.
Table 8
Model Summary (N = 99)
Model
R
R Square
1
.674
0.455
Predictors: (Constant), PBC, SN, ATT

Adjusted
R Square
0.437

Std. Error of
the Estimate
2.62439

Table 9
Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients
1 (Constant)
ATT
SN

B
16.542
0.094
-0.011

Std. Error
2.623
0.079
0.063

Standardized Coefficients
Beta
t
6.307
0.118
1.189
-0.013
-0.173

Sig.
0
0.238
0.863
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PBC
A Dependent Variable: SI
95.0% Confidence Interval for B

0.587

0.097

0.595

6.02

MLR results, as illustrated in Tables 8 and 9, indicate a moderate influence of the
predictors on the dependent variable. This can be seen in the R2 predicating that ATT, SN,
and PBC cause 45.5% change in SI, while R, at .674, indicates an acceptable level of quality
in the prediction. Only PBC proved to be significant at 0.032, after setting alpha at 1-.95 =
.05, while SN and ATT would not be significant at 90% confidence interval. The
shortcomings are most attributable to not having enough survey items in each construct and
will be adjusted in future research. We must fail to reject the null hypotheses that there is no
significant relationship between ISA and security behavior. The ISA variable, in order to
match the TPM model, must show significance in ATT, PBC, and SN on change in SI. In this
study, only PBC is significant. As there is no significance, there is as much probability of
chance causing change in behavior as there is ATT, PBC, and SN.
H1: There is a significant influence of ISA ATT on end-user intention (behavior).
As seen in table 10 and figure 7, the correlation between ATT and SI is r = .496 and is
significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis, as there is a significant
influence on SI by ATT.
Table 10
Pearson Correlation of ATT on SI
ATT
ATT

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

SI
1

99

.496**
0
99

0.032
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Pearson
SI
Correlation
.496**
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
N
99
99
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 7. Pearson Correlation scatterplot SI/ATT
H2: There is a significant influence of ISA SN on end-user intention (behavior).
As seen in the Table 11 and Figure 8, the correlation between SN and SI is r = .124 and
is not significant. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, as there is not significant
influence on SI by SN.
Table 11
Pearson Correlation of SN on SI
SI
SI

SN

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation

SN
1
99

0.124
0.223
99

0.124

1
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Sig. (2-tailed)
N

0.223
99

99

Figure 8. Pearson Correlation scatterplot SI/SN
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H3: There is a significant influence of ISA PBC on end-user intention (behavior).
As seen in Table 12 and Figure 9, the correlation between PBC and SI is r = .668 and is
significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis, as there is a significant
influence on SI by ATT.
Table 12
Pearson correlation of PBC on SI
SI

PBC

Pearson
SI
Correlation
1
.668**
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
N
99
99
Pearson
PBC
Correlation
.668**
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
0
N
99
99
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 9. Pearson Correlation scatterplot SI/PBC
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As Figure 10 indicates, there is very little correlation between each of the independent
variables. The only moderate correlation ATT and PBC as r = 0.640. Also, there is no
significance in the correlation between SN and SI nor SN and PBC.

Figure 10. Correlations of all studied constructs
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Chapter V: Conclusion
This final chapter is divided into two sections: summary discussion and future research
conclusions. The summary discussion section will provide a brief overview of the research,
study background, and discussion of the findings of the study. The future
research/conclusion section will provide analysis on the data collected and application in the
research field. This section also illustrates the need for the continuation of this research
agenda and the importance of further investigation.
Summary Discussion
This study examined the effectiveness of information security awareness (ISA)
programs on end user security behavior. Past research emphasized the relevance of attitudes
and behavior of individuals in relation to protecting information systems, a module that
required far more than technological input (Brdiczka et al, 2012; Crossler et al., 2013;
Dhillon, Syed, &Pedron, 2016; Hsu, Shih, Hung, & Lowry, 2015). Additionally, past
research illustrates that information security awareness programs (ISA) are the common
security bridge between technical and human factor in data risk mitigation. ISA is
commonly defined as an organizational process that aims at educating end-users in its
procedures regarding the protection of the digital assets (Takebayashi, Tsuda, Hasebe, &
Masuoka, 2013; Wheeler & Swick, 2011; Whitman & Mattord, 2011). As the word
awareness implies, an ISA program is designed to create an organizational culture of
proactive secure computing, a culture of security. In the ongoing effort to secure digital
assets, the end-user occupies the role of both friend and foe. Security awareness is a process
that seeks to change individual perceptions, values, attitudes, behavior, norms, and work
habits in an effort to secure vital personal information (Tsohou et.al, 2015). Within the
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individuals security behavior in an organization, the collective security culture of the
organization is revealed. Therefore, this study examined ISA effectiveness on end-user
behavior to help create future footholds of research, frameworks for securing human
behavior. It is imperative to good security that an understanding of the human components,
as well as technical solutions, are necessary to a secure organization.
Some of the more difficult and pervasive aspects of entering into the world of
technology relates to the protection of digital assets by the very people who help create them,
the end-user in an organization. Current research demonstrates that security is not simply a
technology problem, but is primarily a people problem caused by malicious intent,
carelessness, or accident (Desman, 2013; Kim, Lee, Chun, & Benbasat., 2014; Peltier, 2013;
Whitman & Mattord, 2013).
Cybercriminals have a penchant for utilizing any method that tricks end-users into
breaking their security practice. They have little regard for the feelings of safety by end-users
in their quest to hack into heretofore considered safe systems. Cybercriminals employ a wide
variety of hacking methods from pushing malware download on to unsuspecting consumers,
phishing email, even going so far as to pay vulnerable customer service workers who have
access to personal data. Again, ISA programs are designed to alleviate cybercriminal activity
and create wanted secure behavior. Instances of stolen data and accidental data loss created
the underlying theme of this study. Understanding the attitudes (ATT), subjective norms
(SN), and perceived behavioral control (PBC) that motivate the behavior behind user
adoption of ISA (Bandura, 1977; Ajzen, 1985; Mann, 2012) aid in understanding a culture
where risk of data loss can occur.
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Due to the loss of data from cybercrime and cybercriminals, in addition to accidental
losses, human resources involved in the cyber world require the analysis presented in this
study in order to establish policies, procedures, and practices mitigating data loss
(Takebayashi, et al., 2010). Data loss can lead to lost revenue, lost jobs, lack of trust in
essential digital processes, and even lost identity. Therefore, understanding and investigating
the causes of end-user behavior was critical to finding a successful strategy for preventing
further data loss. ISA is the widely accepted strategy for end-user security behavior while
TPB is broadly accepted as a tool for predicting behavior. By applying TPB in connection to
ISA strategies preventing data loss, new security methods, frameworks, technologies, and
policies were suggested through the research presented in the study. However, as the data
demonstrated, relying solely upon technology to deter human interference with data loss
places abnormal stressors on the systems meant to protect end-users from data loss. Tooheavy reliance upon technological deterrents as the demand for information and its
transmission has increased the exposure of sensitive data to cyber security risks. Since ISA
programs are widely accepted as the primary tool for mitigating end-user security risks,
researching the effectiveness of ISA in developing appropriate end-user security behavior
was critical to developing new security methods, frameworks, technologies, and policies The
variety of problems created by cybercriminals established the need for grasping attitudes and
behaviors that laid the foundation for security breaches. The research from this analysis
indicated that both technological and human strategies must be employed in the development
of an information security awareness (ISA) program for organizational protection.
By creating a positive culture that promotes desired security behavior through
appropriate technology, security policies, and an understanding of human motivations, ISA

53
programs are becoming the norm for organizational end-user risk protection (Peltier, 2013;
Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, & Kiountouzis, 2015; Vroom & Solms, 2004). The data
collected through the analysis of this study illustrated that ISA programs may be an effective
manner to build desired end-user security behavior.
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, information accessibility increased
incrementally, often at a speed far more rapid than ISA programs or the average consumer
could prevent cybercrime. As the continuing need to prevent cybercrime increases, so does
the need to increase security. In order for organizations to diminish risk, it is paramount to
start security at the human level and align with technical solutions. It is critical to
understand human behavior and drive a secure culture into the organization.
Since information security (IS) has its basis in human behavior, then the behavior
controlling IS finds its paradigm firmly grounded in the psychological and sociological
behavior of the individuals associated with IS (D’arcy et al., 2009; Ahmed et al., 2012). The
acceptance of effective ISA programs bridges the gap between end-users and technology
(Ahmad et al., 2012; Balerek et al., 2012; Desman, 2013). Any organization applying the
innovative techniques in its technological component must provide its end-users with secure
guidance on expected behavior. End-users have an expectation of a strong and more than
adequate ISA program for their protection. Effective ISA programs that follow with action
not merely technical jargon, find that end-users have a more cooperative attitude toward the
organization and belief in its policies (Peltier, 2011). In other words, actions that influence
the ATT, SN, and PBC of end-users create an organizational culture based on collective
individual behavior that results in lower risk to data theft or loss. The problem that this study
aimed at delineating concerned the manner and effectiveness of an ISA in risk management
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and how these ISA policies related to human weaknesses and strengths. By building on the
research of psychosocial behavior (Stanton et al., 2005) and leveraging established TPB tools
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), this study illustrated the correlation
between using ISA programs to help mitigate security attacks through the illumination of
relevant human behavior. This was accomplished by using a survey that asked questions
around ISA and also the respondent’s behavior in security situations.
The creation of information security policies, standards, procedures, and guidelines is
only the start of establishing effective information security programs. Technology plays a
role, but is not as effective as a trained work force (Brdiczka et al., 2012; Crossler et al.,
2013; Hsu et al., 2015; Dhillon et al., 2016). A well-built technical security architecture will
be rendered less effective if there is no process in place to make certain that the end-users are
made aware of their responsibilities with regard to information assets (Crossler et al., 2013).
An ISA program encompasses end-user awareness, education, and training programs to
address security practices, policies and tools. As this research illustrates, the next step is to
create a culture of security within the organization built on ISA program and understanding
security behavior.
Security policy is the foundation of an ISA program as it establishes practice, sets
boundaries, and creates desired behavior. In most organizations, security policy guidelines
and implementations are the responsibility of the information technology (IT) department
and often a security executive. In particular, a security policy consists of a set of rules and
practices that control how an organization protects and distributes its key information assets,
striking a balance between security and usability (Safa et al., 2012). According to Peltier
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(2013), a good security policy dictates user responsibility that includes threat reporting,
identification of key information security personal, and deterrents for violations.
Security misbehavior is broadly understood as the set of end-users who violate
organizational security policy, that leads to the loss of organizational assets. Users who
engage in intentional misbehavior are either out for profit and/or destruction, and are labeled
intentional malicious insiders. End-users who unintentionally neglect to follow policy and
engage in behaviors which result in asset loss or risk are categorized as unintentional insider
threats (Whitman & Mattord, 2011).
Inappropriate modification of data, altering access to data and the availability of
systems, copying software, selling organizational IP property, and stealing corporate data as
they leave for other jobs are a few examples of intentional undesired behaviors. Providing a
strong ISA program will not halt misbehaviors, and as the study’s data demonstrated, a weak
ISA program could lead to such behavior (Siponen, 2014). Unintentional undesired behavior
such as understanding and being capable of following security policy and practice, but failing
to do so can also lead to loss of organizational assets (Guo, 2010). Unintentional undesired
behavior can also be caused by lack of knowledge or efficacy. Sustaining both intentional
and unintentional loss is a weak ISA program. However, with proper training, educated endusers assume clearer understanding of individual responsibilities behind the establishment of
effective ISA (Peltier, 2013; Tsohou et al., 2015; Vroom & Solms, 2004). The research in
this study built on the importance of an ISA program and outlined the need to study behavior
to create the security minded culture that will further protect organizational digital assets.
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Future Research/Conclusion
The rapid advancement of technology places a continued burden on ISA policy
makers and programs to prevent cybercrime and cybercriminals seeking to misuse, steal, and
sell data for unintended reasons. Maintaining advances in IS systems requires more than just
technology, it also requires understanding human behavior. A combination of technical
skills in conjunction with academic research into understanding the attitudes (ATT),
subjective norms (SN), and perceived behavioral control (PBC) of behavior comprises an
intrinsic part of amending the problem. Individuals or groups involved in cybercrime do so
for a variety of reasons, most of which are intertwined with attitudes of greed and an overall
lack of concern for those they damage. End-users who make mistakes that lead to data loss
are often the result of poor ISA programs. Researchers continue to discover the underlying
behaviors that lay behind the increase of data loss as necessary ingredients to construct IS
systems formulated to combat data loss. This research starts an agenda into that field and
provides many footholds for future research. More specifically, the research agenda being
formed in this study is human behavior factors in information assurance. The first step into
this agenda was to step and look at ISA and secure behavior. This study showed that there is
a correlation between ISA programs and behavior, but will need further tuning on the survey
tool to arrive at significant conclusions.
The research in this study focused on the end-user ATT, SN, and PBC involved in
ISA programs that constructs the behaviors that led to compliance of information security
guidelines, practices, and policies. Current behavioral research in information security relies
heavily on TPB constructs as a precursor to behavior. The hypothesis of the research
conducted by Hu, Kuamg, Lu, and Wu (2014) utilized ATT in the study of software piracy in
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China and the United States, demonstrating that the attitude toward software privacy was
positively related to piracy intent. More specifically, they analyzed software cost, punishment
severity, and punishment certainty as antecedents to attitudes that subsequently contribute to
intent. Not only did their study exhibit that antecedents influence attitude, but they also found
that attitude had the largest influence on piracy intent. In a study by Siponen, Mahmood, and
Pahinila (2014), these researchers found that that security compliance was positively
influenced by ATT, SN, and PBC. Furthermore, these constructs could be cultivated into a
culture by executive-level influence. The outcome of these two studies alone indicated that
TPB constructs are a major component of either cybercriminal behavior or conversely,
compliance led by a security culture created by the behaviors of peers and by those in charge.
Researchers cannot dismiss this aspect of behavior, particularly in light of the fact that the
cyber world is not going to disappear, therefore data loss too will escalate accordingly
without further constructive analysis. This research added to the work above by showing
that end-user security behaviors are modified by ISA programs. Furthermore, the study
illustrated why technical reliance for secure the organization is toxic and will lead to data
loss.
Information awareness programs are a critical component of overall information
security; technology without ISA is not a fully encompassed plan. The universality of
information systems in combination with the on-going requirements for these systems to be
highly accessible, creates the requisite application of newer, more innovative security. As a
result, organizations have advocated for more impactful ISA programs (Mejias, 2012). ISA
in its definitive and systematic place in technology must be inculcated in end-user procedures
in order for their protection of all things digital (Takebayashi, Tsuda, Hasebe, & Masuoka,
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2013; Wheeler & Swick, 2011; Whitman & Mattord, 2011). This study illustrated that the
impact of ISA programs on behavior is critical to making protection more successful. In the
ongoing effort to secure digital assets, the end-user occupies the role of both friend and foe.
Security awareness is a process that seeks to change individual perceptions, values, attitudes,
behavior, norms, work habits, within an organizational culture in order to secure vital
information (Tsohou et al., 2015). As the statistical analysis in this study indicated attitude,
intent, ease of use, self-efficacy, and peer influence relate directly to security intent. The
significance of the data collected self-advocates the importance of understanding TPB
constructs in the ever-increasing cyber world where security cannot be ignored as the Internet
and its multitude of growing components is a world that is here to stay.
Keeping abreast of and ahead of data loss behavior was the vital component behind
this research. Utilizing a mid-size organization with technology as one of its primary and
significant factors endowed the study with the parameters required to help establish the
paradigm of developing and maintaining ISAs proved essential. End-users, by definition all
who use the internet with its growing necessity in everyday lives, must become and be more
aware of the negativity of IT as well as its benefits. However, without ongoing research and
study of secure behavior, data loss will rise far more rapidly than those who rely only on
technology. Bandura’s (1977) theoretical premise of attitude and its effect on behavior
resides comfortably in association with Azjen’s (1985) TPB as behavior predictors of ISA
effectiveness to the use and/or misuse the digital world we live in.
Providing analytical data supported through this quantitative study lays the
foundation for further ongoing research aimed at enhancing knowledge of the behaviors of
those charged with securing the data in their hands against the ultimate benefits, and dangers,
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of the information highway. The twenty-first century’s innovation and love affair with
technology will not cease in spite of the exponential growth of cybercrime, thus it is
imperative to understand the way ISA programs influence the behavior of the end-user in
charge of digital assets. Behavior, trust, security, and innovative ISAs must be the
underpinnings attached to security in the world of information technology and cyber growth.
Armed with a solid ISA program and an understanding of human behavior an organization
can create a culture of security. A culture where security is inclusive of all organizational
employees and technical solutions. The organization will reach a higher level of security
where behaviors can be predicated and expected.
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Appendix B: Survey
The goal of this research survey is to better understand information security awareness (security policy,
practice, tools, procedure, resources, and culture) effectiveness on secure behavior in mid-size
organizations. A secondary focus is to create a tool that can be used to measure this relationship in other
organizations.

Construct

Variable
Name

Demographic

D1

Age

Interval

19-30

31-40

41-50

5160

D2

Gender

M/F

Male

Female

D3

Education

Nominal

High

Colleg

Masters or

School

e

above

1-2 hrs

3-4 hrs

more than 5 hrs

day

day

day

Yes

No

D4

Working with

Interval

others
D5

Received

Nominal

Corporate
Security training

Adapted from Taylor & Todd, 1995;Parsons, McCormac, Pattison, Butivicius, Jerram,
2014; Stanton et al., 2005; Davis 1989
** Likert Scale (1=Strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral
4=agree 5=strongly agree)
Perceived

EU1

Ease of use
(EU)

Following my corporate security policy is
difficult for me

EU2

Following my corporate security policy is
easy for me
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EU3

Having a list of roles and responsibilities for security
makes my role easier

EU4

Keeping up with corporate security training
is not difficult

EU5

I find it easy to report activity that might
cause data loss

Adapted from Taylor & Todd, 1995;Parsons, McCormac, Pattison, Butivicius, Jerram,
2014; Stanton et al., 2005; Davis, 1989
Perceived

** Likert Scale (1=Strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral

usefulness of

4=agree 5=strongly agree)

ISA (PU)

PU1

Being trained in organizational security practices will
help my career

PU2

Being able to follow my organizational security policy
is advantageous to me

PU3

Corporate security tools are not helpful to
my job

PU4

My corporation could benefit from my understanding
of our security practice

Adapted from Taylor & Todd, 1995;Parsons, McCormac, Pattison, Butivicius,
Jerram, 2014; Stanton et al., 2005
Perceived

** Likert Scale (1=Strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral

Supervisor

4=agree 5=strongly agree)

Influence of

SI1

ISA (SI)

I perform my role in security because
management expects me to
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SI2

I will use security tools because management
requires it

SI3

Practicing good security is outlined as part of
my job requirements

SI4

I follow good security practices because my
supervisor does

Adapted from Taylor & Todd, 1995;Parsons, McCormac, Pattison, Butivicius,
Jerram, 2014; Stanton et al., 2005
** Likert Scale (1=Strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral
4=agree 5=strongly agree)
Perceived

PI1

it was important

peer influence
of ISA (PI)

I would follow the corporate security policy if my co-workers told me

PI2

I backup my local data mostly because others tell me it
is important

PI3

I follow security practices that I read about
on the Internet

PI4

I learn how to best protect data from my coworkers

Adapted from Taylor & Todd, 1995;Parsons, McCormac, Pattison, Butivicius,
Jerram, 2014; Stanton et al., 2005
** Likert Scale (1=Strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral
4=agree 5=strongly agree)
ISA Selfefficacy (SE)

SE1

I am certain that I follow all of our organizational
security practices
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SE2

I am able to spot suspicious
emails

SE3

I am adept at learning new
security practices

SE4

I am aware of the security culture in my
organization

Adapted from Taylor & Todd, 1995;Parsons, McCormac, Pattison, Butivicius,
Jerram, 2014; Stanton et al., 2005
** Likert Scale (1=Strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral
4=agree 5=strongly agree)
ISA tool Self-

TSE1

given me (anti-virus etc)

efficacy
(TSE)

I am confident that I can use the security tools my organization has

TSE2

I am capable of guarding passwords as
guided by my organization

TSE3

I am able to learn new security tools/practices that
pertain to my role

TSE4

I know what actions to take to remove a
virus from my computer

Security

Adapted from Taylor & Todd, 1995;Parsons, McCormac, Pattison, Butivicius,

Intention

Jerram, 2014; Stanton et al., 2005

(SINT)

** Likert Scale (1=Strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral
4=agree 5=strongly agree)
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SINT2

I intend to make backup copies of my local
files

SINT3

I intend to follow all security practice and
policy

SINT4

I intend to be aware of secure procedures
protecting digital data

SINT5

I will not share my password
with anyone

SINT 6

I will not click on email attachments from
unknown sources

SINT8

I will not access websites that are deemed inappropriate from my
corporate provided systems (work computer, VPN,)

SINT9

I will not leave my work laptop physically unsecured
when away from the office

SIN10

I will not post unapproved work data on
social websites

SINT11

I will not "hack" into others
computers
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Appendix F: Item Level Frequency
A Study of Information Security Awareness Program Effectiveness in Predicting End-Use
Security Behavior
1. Consent
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Yes
1
109
No
0
0
answered question
109
109
skipped question
0
0

2. What is your age?
Answer Options
19-30
31-40
41-50
50-60
60 and above
answered question
skipped question

Response Percent
0.165
0.266
0.257
0.193
0.119
109
0

Response Count
18
29
28
21
13
109
0

3. What is your gender?
Answer Options
Female
Male
answered question
skipped question

Response Percent
0.615
0.385
109
0

Response Count
67
42
109
0

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer Options
Response Percent
Graduated from high school
0.101
Graduated from 2 year college
0.028
Graduated from college
0.358
Completed graduate school
0.514
answered question
109
skipped question
0

Response Count
11
3
39
56
109
0

5. How often do you work with other employees at the company?
Answer Options
Response Percent
1-2 hours per day
0.321
3-4 hours per day
0.257
More than 5 hours per day
0.422
answered question
109
skipped question
0

Response Count
35
28
46
109
0
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6. Have you received corporate security training?
Answer Options
Response Percent
Yes
0.963
No
0.037
answered question
109
skipped question
0

Response Count
105
4
109
0

7. Following my corporate security policy is difficult for me
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.272
Disagree
0.534
Nuetral
0.097
Agree
0.087
Strongly Agree
0.01
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
28
55
10
9
1
103
6

8. Following my corporate security policy is easy for me
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0.087
Nuetral
0.097
Agree
0.544
Strongly Agree
0.272
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
0
9
10
56
28
103
6

9. Having a list of roles and responsibilities for security makes my role easier
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Strongly disagree
0
0
Disagree
0.049
5
Nuetral
0.214
22
Agree
0.553
57
Strongly Agree
0.184
19
answered question
103
103
skipped question
6
6

10. Keeping up with corporate security training is not difficult
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0.068
Nuetral
0.165
Agree
0.534
Strongly Agree
0.233
answered question
103

Response Count
0
7
17
55
24
103
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skipped question

6

11. I find it easy to report activity that might cause data loss
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.019
Disagree
0.049
Nuetral
0.252
Agree
0.427
Strongly Agree
0.252
answered question
103
skipped question
6

6

Response Count
2
5
26
44
26
103
6

12. Being trained in organizational security practices will help my career
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Strongly disagree
0.01
1
Disagree
0.117
12
Nuetral
0.223
23
Agree
0.427
44
Strongly Agree
0.223
23
answered question
103
103
skipped question
6
6

13. Being able to follow my organizational security policy is advantageous to me
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Strongly disagree
0
0
Disagree
0.029
3
Nuetral
0.146
15
Agree
0.524
54
Strongly Agree
0.301
31
answered question
103
103
skipped question
6
6

14. Corporate security tools are not helpful to my job
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.262
Disagree
0.427
Nuetral
0.223
Agree
0.078
Strongly Agree
0.01
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
27
44
23
8
1
103
6

15. My corporation could benefit from my understanding of our security practice
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Strongly disagree
0.019
2
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Disagree
Nuetral
Agree
Strongly Agree
answered question
skipped question

0.058
0.291
0.447
0.184
103
6

16. I perform my role in security because management expects me to
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.029
Disagree
0.097
Nuetral
0.165
Agree
0.495
Strongly Agree
0.214
answered question
103
skipped question
6

6
30
46
19
103
6

3
10
17
51
22
103
6

17. I will use security tools because management requires it
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.029
Disagree
0.058
Nuetral
0.117
Agree
0.515
Strongly Agree
0.282
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
3
6
12
53
29
103
6

18. Practicing good security is outlined as part of my job requirements
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.01
Disagree
0.068
Nuetral
0.097
Agree
0.427
Strongly Agree
0.398
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
1
7
10
44
41
103
6

19. I follow good security practices because my supervisor does
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.068
Disagree
0.184
Nuetral
0.427
Agree
0.223
Strongly Agree
0.097
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
7
19
44
23
10
103
6
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20. I would follow the corporate security policy if my co-workers told me it was important
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Strongly disagree
0.029
3
Disagree
0.107
11
Nuetral
0.262
27
Agree
0.398
41
Strongly Agree
0.204
21
answered question
103
103
skipped question
6
6

21. I backup my local data mostly because others tell me it is important
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.087
Disagree
0.456
Nuetral
0.32
Agree
0.107
Strongly Agree
0.029
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
9
47
33
11
3
103
6

22. I follow security practices that I read about on the Internet
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.039
Disagree
0.291
Nuetral
0.311
Agree
0.291
Strongly Agree
0.068
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
4
30
32
30
7
103
6

23. I learn how to best protect data from my co-workers
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.058
Disagree
0.233
Nuetral
0.262
Agree
0.34
Strongly Agree
0.107
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
6
24
27
35
11
103
6

24. I am certain that I follow all of our organizational security practices
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0.087

Response Count
0
9
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Nuetral
Agree
Strongly Agree
answered question
skipped question

0.175
0.612
0.126
103
6

18
63
13
103
6

Response Percent
0
0
0.049
0.563
0.388
103
6

Response Count
0
0
5
58
40
103
6

26. I am adept at learning new security practices
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.01
Disagree
0.019
Nuetral
0.194
Agree
0.563
Strongly Agree
0.214
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
1
2
20
58
22
103
6

27. I am aware of the security culture in my organization
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0.078
Nuetral
0.068
Agree
0.621
Strongly Agree
0.233
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
0
8
7
64
24
103
6

25. I am able to spot suspicious emails
Answer Options
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Nuetral
Agree
Strongly Agree
answered question
skipped question

28. I am confident that I can use the security tools my organization has given me (anti-virus
etc)
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Strongly disagree
0
0
Disagree
0.049
5
Nuetral
0.078
8
Agree
0.583
60
Strongly Agree
0.291
30
answered question
103
103
skipped question
6
6
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29. I am capable of guarding passwords as guided by organization
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0
Nuetral
0.039
Agree
0.369
Strongly Agree
0.592
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
0
0
4
38
61
103
6

30. I am able to learn new security tools/practices that pertain to my role
Answer Options
Response Percent
Response Count
Strongly disagree
0
0
Disagree
0.01
1
Nuetral
0.107
11
Agree
0.583
60
Strongly Agree
0.301
31
answered question
103
103
skipped question
6
6

31. I know what actions to take to remove a virus from my computer
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.049
Disagree
0.282
Nuetral
0.155
Agree
0.35
Strongly Agree
0.165
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
5
29
16
36
17
103
6

32. I intend to make backup copies of my local files
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.029
Disagree
0.184
Nuetral
0.301
Agree
0.262
Strongly Agree
0.223
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
3
19
31
27
23
103
6

33. I intend to follow all security practice and policy
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.01
Disagree
0
Nuetral
0.039

Response Count
1
0
4

91
Agree
Strongly Agree
answered question
skipped question

0.485
0.466
103
6

50
48
103
6

34. I intend to be aware of secure procedures protecting digital data
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0
Nuetral
0.107
Agree
0.515
Strongly Agree
0.379
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
0
0
11
53
39
103
6

35. I will not share my password with anyone
Answer Options
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Nuetral
Agree
Strongly Agree
answered question
skipped question

Response Count
0
1
1
24
77
103
6

Response Percent
0
0.01
0.01
0.233
0.748
103
6

36. I will always log off or lockout my computer when it is unattended
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0.039
Disagree
0.165
Nuetral
0.126
Agree
0.398
Strongly Agree
0.272
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
4
17
13
41
28
103
6

37. I will not click on email attachments from unknown sources
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0.01
Nuetral
0.019
Agree
0.379
Strongly Agree
0.592
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
0
1
2
39
61
103
6

92
38. I will not leave my work laptop physically unsecured when away from the office
Answer Options
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Nuetral
Agree
Strongly Agree
answered question
skipped question

Response Percent
0.039
0.087
0.058
0.427
0.388
103
6

Response Count
4
9
6
44
40
103
6

39. I will not post unapproved work data on social websites
Answer Options
Response Percent
Strongly disagree
0
Disagree
0
Nuetral
0
Agree
0.184
Strongly Agree
0.816
answered question
103
skipped question
6

Response Count
0
0
0
19
84
103
6

40. I will not "hack" into others computers
Answer Options
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Nuetral
Agree
Strongly Agree
answered question
skipped question

Response Count
1
1
0
9
92
103
6

Response Percent
0.01
0.01
0
0.087
0.893
103
6
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Appendix G
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std.
Deviation

What is your age?

109

1.00

5.00

2.8349

1.25841

What is your gender?

109

1.00

2.00

1.3853

.48892

What is the highest level
of education you have
completed?

109

1.00

4.00

3.2844

.93385

How often do you work
with other employees at
the company?

109

1.00

3.00

2.1009

.86007

Have you received
corporate security
training?

109

1.00

2.00

1.0367

.18889

Following my corporate
security policy is difficult
for me

103

1.00

5.00

2.0291

.90159

94

Following my corporate
security policy is easy for
me

103

2.00

5.00

4.0000

.85176

Having a list of roles and
responsibilities for
security makes my role
easier

103

2.00

5.00

3.8738

.76286

Keeping up with
corporate security
training is not difficult

103

2.00

5.00

3.9320

.81964

I find it easy to report
activity that might cause
data loss

103

1.00

5.00

3.8447

.92628

Being trained in
organizational security
practices will help my
career

103

1.00

5.00

3.7379

.96975

Being able to follow my
organizational security
policy is advantageous to
me

103

2.00

5.00

4.0971

.74774

Corporate security tools
are not helpful to my job

103

1.00

5.00

2.1456

.93313

95

My corporation could
benefit from my
understanding of our
security practice

103

1.00

5.00

3.7184

.90117

I perform my role in
security because
management expects me
to

103

1.00

5.00

3.7670

.99216

I will use security tools
because management
requires it

103

1.00

5.00

3.9612

.94891

Practicing good security
is outlined as part of my
job requirements

103

1.00

5.00

4.1359

.91874

I follow good security
practices because my
supervisor does

103

1.00

5.00

3.0971

1.03388

I would follow the
corporate security policy
if my co-workers told me
it was important

103

1.00

5.00

3.6408

1.01802

I backup my local data
mostly because others
tell me it is important

103

1.00

5.00

2.5340

.90549

96

I follow security
practices that I read about
on the Internet

103

1.00

5.00

3.0583

1.00806

I learn how to best
protect data from my coworkers

103

1.00

5.00

3.2039

1.09687

I am certain that I follow
all of our organizational
security practices

103

2.00

5.00

3.7767

.77879

I am able to spot
suspicious emails

103

3.00

5.00

4.3398

.56972

I am adept at learning
new security practices

103

1.00

5.00

3.9515

.75898

I am aware of the
security culture in my
organization

103

2.00

5.00

4.0097

.78584

I am confident that I can
use the security tools my
organization has given
me (anti-virus etc)

103

2.00

5.00

4.1165

.74493

97

I am capable of guarding
passwords as guided by
organization

103

3.00

5.00

4.5534

.57272

I am able to learn new
security tools/practices
that pertain to my role

103

2.00

5.00

4.1748

.64818

I know what actions to
take to remove a virus
from my computer

103

1.00

5.00

3.3010

1.18681

I intend to make backup
copies of my local files

103

1.00

5.00

3.4660

1.11861

I intend to follow all
security practice and
policy

103

1.00

5.00

4.3981

.66184

I intend to be aware of
secure procedures
protecting digital data

103

3.00

5.00

4.2718

.64465

I will not share my
password with anyone

103

2.00

5.00

4.7184

.53169

98

I will always log off or
lockout my computer
when it is unattended

103

1.00

5.00

3.6990

1.15330

I will not click on email
attachments from
unknown sources

103

2.00

5.00

4.5534

.58959

I will not leave my work
laptop physically
unsecured when away
from the office

103

1.00

5.00

4.0388

1.07487

I will not post
unapproved work data on
social websites

103

4.00

5.00

4.8155

.38976

I will not "hack" into
others computers

103

1.00

5.00

4.8447

.55585

Valid N (listwise)

103

